
A backup is useful only when you can restore it under pressure. Ransomware operators target reachable backups, so keep critical copies offline and encrypted. Immutable storage adds protection, but misconfiguration still matters. Treat offline and immutable as complementary.
Use a 3-2-1 baseline: three copies, on two media, with one off-site. Test availability and integrity regularly in a real disaster-recovery scenario. Restore files, databases, and systems—not just a “successful” dashboard. Keep golden images and version-controlled infrastructure definitions for clean rebuilds. See our backup strategies guide for restore checks.
Define a Recovery Time Objective (RTO) and Recovery Point Objective (RPO) for each service. Critical data may need more frequent backups. Document dependencies and failover decisions; a backup without a target is only hope.
Exercise the incident response plan with a tabletop scenario and hands-on DR drill. Keep an offline copy, automate repeatable steps, and record failures or delays. Feed lessons into the next test. CISA and ENISA/CERT-EU guidance emphasizes tested recovery. Test restores. Schedule restore tests.
Related areas
Related What I Do
These What I Do pages are matched from the subject matter of this article, creating a cleaner path from educational content to implementation work.
Continue reading
Related articles
Based on shared categories first, then the strongest overlap in tags.

